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BOOK REVIEWS
Published for
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute London:
Taylor and Francis, 1980. Pp. 201. Reviewed by W. Paul
Gormley. *
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION.

As an indispensable phase of its efforts to achieve worldwide
disarmament, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has published a number of studies devoted to the
elimination of chemical warfare. 1 As a phase of its campaign seeking disarmament, this volume, dealing with the unique area of
chemical warfare, was produced.
In view of the success achieved by the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
the reader may ask what, in reality, is the future potential of
chemical warfare? Until the use of chemical agents against innocent civilians and poorly armed tribesmen by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the answer probably would have been negative. On the
other hand, the indiscriminate use of chemicals against the Vietnam environment haunts the prior success in the application of
2
the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
While not classified as a stragetic weapon in the sense of nuclear power,8 chemical agents are weapons of mass destruction
and therefore their use should be treated as a crime against hu* B.A. 1949, San Jose State University; M.A. 1951, University of Southern

California; Ph.D. 1952, University of Denver; J.D. (hons) 1957, LL.M. 1958,
George Washington University; M.Int.-Comp.L., D.Jur., 1975, Free University of

Brussels (VUB); LL.D. 1972, Victoria University of Manchester. Leverhulme
and Simon Fellows, 1968-1972, University of Manchester, England. Member

of

the District of Columbia and United States Supreme Court bars.
1.

SIPRI, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION 1-2, n.1-3 (and

the sources cited therein) (1980) [hereinafter cited as CHEMICAL WEAPONS.] See
also, A. Westing, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MILITARY IMPACT ON THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1980). As indicated in CHEMICAL WEAPONS, the SIPRI
Yearbooks contain a series of major studies devoted to the elimination of chemical weapons and their production.

2. A.

Westing, ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA

WAR

(1976); and A. Westing, Ch. 3, Tropical Regions, in WARFARE IN A FRAGILE
WORLD, supra note 1, at 71-103.
3. SIPRI, NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION (1979).
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manity. Primarily because of the injuries needlessly sustained by
those persons least able to protect themselves,' the use of chemical agents shocks the conscience of mankind. Accordingly, SIPRI
is correct in treating chemical warfare as an indispensable phase
of total (or even partial) disarmament, and this book, by focusing
its attention on the single subject, renders a significant contribution while recognizing related areas, such as environmental protection and ocean pollution.
The book is a permanent record, although edited, of an international symposium organized by SIPRI in June of 1979. The purpose of this conference and of the subsequent book was to focus
attention upon current negotiations and to attempt to promulgate
a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, storage,
or use of chemical weapons. In addition to the destruction-or
conversion to peaceful uses-of existing stockpiles of these weapons, the distinguished group of thirty experts discussed fundamental problems, such as the destruction of existing plants, onsite inspections (or on-the-spot inspections), varying means of
verification (singularly, the most important stage in the disarmament process), the scientific methods that will be selected to deactivate weapons, production facilities, and the scope of proposed
treaty texts. Aside from military, policy, and legal choices, economic implications become crucial, especially as public safety and
environmental safeguards even at the regional and global levels
become applicable. Accordingly, the book attempts to indicate the
methods and procedures by which chemical weapons disarmament may be achieved. While the two superpowers should provide
the example in this phase of worldwide disarmament, it needs to
be recognized that all nations-including the dictatorship of the
left and the right-must eliminate their chemical warfare
capability.
At the outset, this book renders its major contribution by dealing with the implementation of measures designed to outlaw
chemical warfare and the production of supporting chemical
agents. In its efforts to concentrate on future attempts to control
and eliminate warfare, the book confronts the basic difficulty not
present in other aspects of disarmament: the lack of reliable information. In the first paper, by Dr. J.P. Perry Robinson, the basic reality facing disarmament is conceded: neither NATO nor the
4. Compare the language in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1971

Protocols.
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Warsaw Pact has released information as to their chemical weapons capability. Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union
have withheld information from the general public. The last Soviet pronouncement was given in 1938; consequently, scholars and
policy makers must rely on intelligence sources. Obviously, there
may exist a credibility gap that in turn will adversely affect any
conclusions advanced in the present volume. By way of example,
the methods of verification proposed may prove inadequate if
chemical warfare capacity remains undetected. Several of the authors recognize this inherent shortcoming. Notwithstanding the
"iron curtain" that has been drawn across any public view of existing chemical weaponry, a three-stage system of control is proposed: 1) monitoring, 2) assessment, and 3) evaluation. The first
stage of monitoring, which appears to be the most difficult to
achieve, is discussed in a number of papers. For instance, the use
of remote sensing satellites and other airborne sensing devices
can detect potential violations, but the book unmistakably indicates that satellites alone will be unable to afford a completely
reliable system of verification. 5
Against the background of incomplete information and serious
limitations in the proposed verification system, the ultimate requirement is proposed, namely, international cooperation. Indeed,
this reviewer has advocated a higher degree of regional and international cooperation to resolve major environmental problems
confronting mankind.8 Not by chance, the premise offered in the
Introduction is that the "degree of trust and mutual confidence
obtaining between parties to the international negotiations may
thus become more important than the merits and demerits, objectively considered, of competing combinations of treaty provisions
on elimination, preclusion, scope, and verification." This theme of
mutual cooperation is also fundamental to the position of Dr.
LundinJ who seeks to "create" "confidence-building measures,"
5. This reviewer is a strong supporter of the use of remote sensing satellites
in a number of areas, such as the detection of ocean pollution. See e.g., B. Jassani, Outer Space - Battlefield of the Future? (SIPRI, 1978); Gormley, Book
Review, V ANNALS Am & SPACE L.
(1980). See generally, Diederisk-Ver-

schoor & Gormley, The Future Legal Status of Nongovernmental Entities In
Outer Space: Private Individuals and Companies as Subjects and Beneficiaries
of International Space Law, 5 J. SPACE L. 125 (1977).
6. W. Gormley, HuMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (1976).

7. S. Lundin, Confidence-building Measures and Chemical Weapons Con-
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particularly between the superpowers. Beginning with the provisions of the Helsinki Declaration-on the assumption that such
confidence-building measures can be traced to the deliberations
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe-he
suggests that those states possessing chemical weapons must generate a sense of trust in their negotiations leading up to a disarmament treaty and in its subsequent observance. In support of
his plan to eliminate chemical weapons, Dr. Lundin maintains
that confidence-building measures applicable prior to the entry
into force of a chemical disarmament convention also be incorporated within the scope of treaty texts, and remain relevant apart
from the treaty provisions. A number of stages involving increased cooperation between states is proposed, especially during
the verification process. Thus, a complaints procedure is proposed: a committee of experts, established pursuant to a disarmament treaty, possibly within the framework of an international
disarmament organization, is also advocated as a means of implementation. If this alternative, strongly favored by the reviewer,
becomes functional, the treaty instrument will control the confidence-building measures, pursuant to the norm of pacta sunt servanda. Yet, the authors recognize the importance of enacting an
international convention-and realistically the difficulty of securing universal ratification, in view of the fact that less than ninety
states have ratified the 1979 Convention on the Prohibitionof the
Development, Productionand Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction-but
they do not rely exclusively upon this type of legal solution.
In evaluating this approach, it appears that the alternative solution, international and regional, plus bilaterial cooperation between superpowers (absent a treaty), may render significant contributions, particularly during the negotiations leading up to the
adoption of a multilateral convention. Owing to the nature of disarmament and the necessity for universality, the types of implementing measures required and emphasized in the book demand
an organizational structure. While the superpowers, even with the
cooperation of a group of industrialized states, may be able to
agree to specified measures of weapons destruction and verification procedures, states jealous of their sovereignty (e.g., Commu-

vention, in CHEMICAL WEAPONS 139.

8. J. Goldblat, Part IH, Status of US-Soviet Negotiations for a Chemical
Weapons Convention, in CHEMICAL WEAPONS 157.
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nist China, France, India, Pakistan, plus the dictatorships of the
left and of the right) will be at least as hesitant to submit to international control of their chemical manufacture as they are toward control of their nuclear capability.
As can be seen from the fields of human rights protection and
the safeguard of the environment, more modest goals can lead to
a significant degree of success, which in turn may lead to steps
being taken toward a far-reaching solution, an example being the
entry into force of the United Nations Human Rights Covenants.
Consequently, the thrust of the symposium convened by SIPRI
has taken a realistic approach. These experts conceive of a ten to
twenty year period to achieve a functional system of disarmament. Because of the fact that chemical warfare was not used in
World War II, and that it is regulated by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, immediate action is not required; a more deliberate and
piecemeal approach therefore can be employed. The use of chemical warfare in Vietnam by the United States and by the Soviet
forces in Afghanistan, however, attests to outbreaks of chemical
warfare regardless of the Protocol.
One major shortcoming remains: the need of international supervision within an organizational structure is conceded, but a detailed proposal is lacking. Hence, the required solution is offered
but not discussed. Detailed information is provided as to the
technical measures that are available to deactivate facilities, particularly the means of production.9 In the first instance, existing
weapons and stockpiles of chemicals must either be 1) destroyed,
or 2) converted to peaceful uses; however, the cost of either procedure is tremendous. Generally, it is much more costly to convert
chemical weapons to peaceful uses, as for example to pesticides or
agricultural substances, than to manufacture those products from
raw materials at the outset. The desirable solution is still, however, to convert these substances to peaceful uses, rather than assume the risks inherent in attempted destruction. Only the cost
factor, and possibly the length of time required, may limit this
alternative. 10 Indeed, much of the difficulty confronting any sys9. R. Mikulak, Destruction of US Chemical Weapons Production and Filling Facilities,in CHEMCAL WEAPONS 57.
10. K. Lobs, Destruction or Conversion of Chemical Warfare Agents: Possibilities and Alternatives, in CHEMcAL WFAPONS 69. He concludes:
Most of these compounds and most of the other intermediates of CW
agents can find application in the civilian chemical industry for the manu-
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tern of verification can be traced to the fact that similar production plants are used to manufacture chemicals for peaceful purposes. As a result, frequent on-sight inspections are essential;
however, neither private industry nor the government affected
will consent to such constant interference by international teams
of inspectors owing to a legitimate necessity to safeguard industrial secrets. The authors take the position that only physical surveillance can assure the peaceful employment of these chemicalproducing installations.
The first alternative, however, destruction by burning, exploding, or dumping, has an even greater destructive potential because of the possibility of environmental destruction and the danger to human beings. Major health hazards arise to persons
residing in the immediate area and to the personnel attempting to
dispose of these weapons systems. As shown by Dr. Kurata,11 serious accidents occurred after World War II when attempts were
made by the American military government to destroy the chemical weaponry of the former Imperial Forces. A total of one hundred and two separate accidents, resulting in one hundred and
twenty-seven casualties, occurred in connection with these chemical elimination experiments. Not only were people killed and seriously injured throughout these events (even though no one had
been killed during World War II by gas, owing to the abstention
from chemical warfare), but the ocean environment was polluted.
Fishing grounds and the indigenous fisheries were contaminated;
-Japanese fishermen were killed or injured when these containers
were dragged from continental shelf regions in their fishing nets.
These injuries and widespread environmental pollution occurred
as the result of defective disposal techniques. Lessons can be
12
learned from these tragedies that may guide future experiments.
facture of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, dyestuffs or plastics. These substances are valuable as base products and also in terms of the essential raw

materials from which they are synthesized.
Id. at 70 (sources omitted).
11. H. Kurata, Lessons Learned From the Destruction of the Chemical
Weapons of the Japanese Imperial Forces, in CHEmcAt WEAPONS 77.
12. Id. at 89-90. A somewhat similar experience took place in Europe following World War II, when Nazi chemical substances were dumped into the Baltic

Sea.
The best known case of stockpile destruction was carried out in a kind of
disarmament effort after the defeat of Germany in 1945, during which
large quantities of chemical stockpiles (including nerve agents and mus-
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It is much more costly, in the long term, to attempt disposal in
remote portions of the globe or in outer space, as has been suggested for the disposal of nuclear materials.13
The conclusion offered by Kurata is that a treaty should set
forth standards to safeguard mankind and the environment, as
follows:
The various stages of a disposal system, such as reception of a consignment of weapons from the possessor country, transportation,
storage, actual disposal operations, recording and notification,
should be clearly set out in a future treaty prohibiting chemical
weapons. There should be proper inspection at every stage.
Dr. Kurata concedes the disturbing fact that terrorists may be
able to seize such chemical substances. The use to which chemical
weapons can be put need not be elaborated: "[T]hus, the importance of the certain, safe and secure disposal of CW agents and
chemical munitions cannot be overemphasized."
Other authors, e.g., Vojvodi6 and Binenfeld, 14 deal with the inherent dangers to be confronted when attempting to achieve the
objective of conversion and destruction of military-type chemicals. Solutions of a medical nature are proposed in a series of
short papers, constituting the middle portion of text. Human
safety in a working atmosphere is outlined, including the indirect
utilization of an appropriate convention of the International Labour Organization, i.e., the Working Environment (Air Pollution,
Noise and Vibration) Convention, adopted by the International
Labour Conference in 1977. Such ILO conventions and recommendations are extremely valuable in establishing tolerable exposure limits to govern chemical contacts. It must not be minimized
that national criteria and methods for determining relatively safe
"exposure limits" differ considerably. Nevertheless, common criteria can be drawn from national experience to'protect human beings. The World Health Organization (WHO) has shown special
competence in dealing with the "recognition and control of envitard gas) were dumped by the Allies in the ocean. The experience of Dan-

ish fishermen in the Baltic have particularly shown that this type of destruction was not of a permanent nature.
A. Ooms, Verification of the Destructionof Stockpiles of Chemical Weapons, in
CHEMICAL WEPONS 125.
13. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NucLEAR WEAPON PROLnFERATION, supra note 3.

14. V. Vojvodi6 & Z. Binenfeld, Some Toxicological Problems in the Destruction of Chemical Warfare Agents, in CHEMICAL WARFARE 95.
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ronmental conditions and hazards affecting human health. According to Dr. Rosival, WHO has had considerable experience in
cooperating with member states in perfecting environmental
health projects. Accordingly, the need for an organizational structure at the international level is again stressed. In this portion of
the book it becomes evident that the several distinct phases in
the process of the destruction of chemical weaponry require international supervision. Whereas national agencies must control and
destroy chemical agents in the first instance, international consultative bodies and committees of experts are required. 15
The final series of papers considers in some detail the problems
of verification that were originally raised in the opening portions
of the text.10 This single phase within the total disarmament process is also the most difficult to realize, because of the lack of
trust between the major military powers. Accordingly, Dr. E.
Roberts places considerable emphasis on repeated inspections,
encompassing frequent on-site inspections, as indicated earlier in
this review. 17 The significant thrust of Roberts' approach is the
use of scientific verification techniques for the building of mutual
trust and confidence. He recommends:
The simplest and most effective set of on-site monitoring devices
would be a combination of temperature sensors installed in each of
the major reaction units (probably three to five) plus a physical
barrier that would deny access to the central control panel. Also
motion-triggered cameras and seismic sensors could be used effectively to detect activity in critical areas. The integrity of both the
sensors and the barrier would be preserved by the installation of
tamper-indicating seals.
Policy makers and jurists would do well to consider the use of
such approaches to verification. Here, the scientific community
can render a significant contribution toward disarmament and
15. 0. Reutov & K. Babievsky, Some Aspects of the Problem of the Destruction of Chemical Warfare Agents, in CHEMcAL WEAPONS 117 (a good summary
of prior negotiations at the international level).
16. See R. Roberts, Verification Problems - Monitoring of Conversion and
Destruction of Chemical-Warfare Agent Plant, in CHEMIcAL WEAPONS 129; and
A. Ooms, supra note 12, at 123. Significantly, he takes a position contrary to

that of J. Robinson, id. at 9-56. Dr. Ooms maintains: "It is probable that the
intelligence organizations of the USA and the USSR are aware of stockpile sites
of chemical weapons and have made reasonable guesses of their sizes." Id. at

124.
17. R. Roberts, supra note 16, at 129.

Winter 1981]

BOOK REVIEWS

world peace."'
Regardless of any available global machinery that is part of a
program of an international organization, procedures for continued verification and assessment are required. The unfortunate refusal of states to participate has been indicated earlier in this review.1 9 Yet one basic fact must not be minimized: only the major
industrialized states have the capability to employ sophisticated
verification equipment.
The series of authors have conceded the reality of international
life. Although they also recognize the hazards facing man and his
environment from the mere existence of chemical weapons, they
indicate the steps that should be taken. Tragically, military powers are not prepared to curtail their freedom of action or to ratify
a chemical disarmament treaty. The book presents a wealth of
information, though a few areas, such as the required organizational structure, might have been treated in more detail. In several cases, significant topics were covered in merely a few pages, 20
which resulted in the weakening of key topics.
The Assessment and the conclusions of the symposium are advanced by SIPRI in the second part of the book. The authors
come to thirteen precise conclusions. On the whole, these conclusions do reflect the book's contents, even though SIPRI's position
does tend to be more sweeping than the original presentations.
Considered as one segment within the continuing efforts of
SIPRI's global disarmament program, this book constitutes a significant contribution; for the specialist in disarmament, the book
deals in depth with a fundamental aspect of the total area, and
for the policy maker or international lawyer, it provides an overview of a topic that easily might be minimized. Accordingly, this
book has achieved its intended objective.

18. See generally Gormley, The Contributionof Scientists Toward the Development of International Environmental Law, 36 INDIAN J. POL. Sci. 358
.(1975).
19. But cf. the shortcomings, indeed the dangers, of completely relying on
remote sensing, R. Roberts, supra note 16, at 138.
20. E.g., A. Ooms, supra note 12; L. Rosival, Biomedical Aspects of the Destruction and Conversion of Chemical Warfare Agents, in CHEMICAL WEAPONS
107; and B. Boskovik & R. Kusi6, Long-Term Effects of Acute Exposure to
Nerve Gases Upon Human Health, in CHEICAL WEAPONS 113.

Hermann Kantorowicz. Edited by A.H.
Campbell, with an introduction by A.L. Goodhart. New York: Octagon Books, 1980. Notes and bibliography. Pp. 113. Reviewed by
John E. Semonche.*
THE DEFINITION OF LAW.

Hermann Kantorowicz, a refugee from Nazi Germany who became Assistant Director of Research in Law at the University of
Cambridge and Lecturer at All Souls College, Oxford, undertook
in the late 1930's the foreboding task of putting together a threevolume publication to be entitled The Oxford History of Legal
Science. Planning to garner original publications on law encompassing the ancient Chinese and Greeks to the present, he assigned responsibility for the projected chapters in the first two
volumes before the project was temporarily halted by the outbreak of World War II. Neither the project nor its guiding spirit
survived the war. What Kantorowicz did, however, was complete
an introductory essay sketching the boundaries that he hoped
would house the varying legal cultures that were to be traced in
the projected volumes. After fairly liberal editing by A.H. Campbell, Regius Professor of Public Law of the University of Edinburgh, this essay was first published in 1957 with the author's
notes and bibliography and with an introduction by A.L. Goodhart, Master of University College, Oxford. In this duplication of
the original publication, the Goodhart introduction is especially
useful in providing a perspective on the evolution of the author's
thoughts on his subject.
To set the stage for the historical essays, Kantorowicz sought
the broadest possible definition that would still have the the effect of separating legal science from related areas of rule making.
As he undertook this task, however, his own persecution by the
National Socialists and the alarm with which he viewed Germany
in the 1930's were factors that compromised his scholarly disinterest. He was personally committed to refuting John Austin's
theories that law was no more than the command of the sovereign
and that international law was not law but a matter of public morality.1 The serviceability of Austin's views for Adolph Hitler was
* Professor of History and former Lecturer in Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A., 1954, Brown University; M.A. 1955, Northwestern Uni-

versity; Ph.D., 1962, Northwestern University; LL.B., 1967, Duke University.
1. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
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obvious. Kantorowicz's equation of law and science was not uncritical, for he recognized that, unlike the natural and physical
sciences, law was concerned with values. What the equation primarily meant for him was that in his quest for a definition of law
he wanted to vanquish all verbal magic with its pretentions to
truth and seek a formulation that would be useful "by connecting
what ought to be connected and separating and what ought to be
separated."'2 Then, and only then, could meaningful statements
be made. He called his approach "conceptual pragmatism,"'
which, in essence, was what F.S. Cohen had labelled the functional method.4 Kantorowicz began by criticizing a series of partial definitions of law, including the restriction of the term to positive law, to rules that are enforced, and to decisions of judges
(legal realism), that fell short of embracing the totality of law.
He devotes the remaining chapters of the book to defending his
definition of law as "a body of social rules prescribing external
conduct and considered justifiable ' 5 against both charges of narrowness and expansiveness. This formulation is concise but
hardly unambiguous. By "a body of social rules" he means a body
in which the components possess common characteristics that
make them coherent and interdependent. Following the author
thus far causes no real problem, but when he reduces all law to
prescriptions, some difficulty is introduced. For instance, W.N.
Hohfeld has argued that a permissive right may be conferred by
law without the necessity of protecting it from interference,
thereby suggesting that a formula of prescription that seeks to
elide all rights into corresponding duties would be deficient.'
Campbell, the editor of the book, is impressed with this objection.
It is possible, however, to argue that a case can be made for excluding the permissive right from a definition of law. At any rate,
this problem is relatively minor in comparison to those introduced by the remaining words of the definition.
By restricting law to external conduct the author intended to
exclude moral precepts or what others have called moral law.
2. H.

KANTOROWlcz, THE DEFINITION OF LAW

(1980).

3. Id. adt
5-10.
4. See F.S. COHEN, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 835-42 (1935). Cohen acknowledges the work of Kantorowicz.
Id. n.72.
5. Supra note 2, at 79.
6. W.N. HOHFELD, FuNrmAENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 39-44 (1923).
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Contending that law concerned itself only with external conduct
and the realm of morals with internal conduct, Kantorowicz
sought to pierce through the ever-present fog and present a clear
dividing line between the two. Noting that the law is loaded with
terms such as good faith, malice, meeting of the minds, the author stated that the law considers only external conduct in making these assessments. Although we might agree that this practice
is often the case, it certainly is far from universally true. Presumptions can be rebutted. What seemed to worry the author was
the Nazi claim that law and morality were one, a claim that obviously posed threats to the individual conscience. Kantorowicz acknowledged that many societies have had laws against heresy, but
he argued that the enactment of such legislation no more makes
the rule part of the law than the enactment of the multiplication
tables in a statute would make them the law. Throughout his
treatment the author is critical of attempts to dismiss, as nonlaw, rules that are not enforced or rules that are not just, but here
he seems to say that what is obviously part of the positive law is
not law at all. Since a ban on heresy seeks to condition belief,
Kantorowicz argues, its enactment into a code cannot legitimize
its bastardy within a system that is designed to concern itself exclusively with external behavior. There is a difference, however,
between an admonition against heritical thoughts and a law that
has to work with the manifestation of such thoughts in external
behavior. Galileo was forced to recant his belief in a heliocentric
universe and to forebear teaching such a doctrine not because he
held uncommunicated thoughts but rather because he made them
part of his external behavior. The law continues to deal not with
what people believe but with what they say they believe.
Kantorowicz wanted to build a wall between internal and external
behavior, but the cement that will hold such a wall together has
not been found. Just as what is internal can easily become external, so can external manifestations lead to a probing of the internal self. The author is correct in his view that the. law is not concerned with whether an act was motivated by moral or immoral
thoughts, but to argue that the state of the subjective mind is of
no concern to the law is simply not correct. The psychiatrist who
is evaluating a defendant's claim of insanity is indeed observing
what the individual does and says, but he is charged with the very
subjective task of determining the actual mental state of an individual at a time prior to that of his examination. Certainly this is
an internal inquiry that an evaluation of external conduct can aid
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but not presume to decide. We can sympathize with
Kantorowicz's attempt to isolate the internal side of man from
the tentacles of the law, but the physiological and psychological
validity of creating an impassable barrier is doubtful.
Finally, Kantorowicz seeks in the last part of his definition to
distinguish social custom from law. Recognizing that content does
not differentiate the two bodies of rules, the author resorts to the
phrase "and considered justiciable." In the most compressed part
of his definition, Kantorowicz first tries to accommodate unenforced rules by adding a subjective criterion that the people who
apply the rules or those who want to see them applied consider
them fit to be applied, whether they actually are or not. Where
other aspects of Kantorowicz's formulation are too narrow, the reduction of law to a body of rules that an interested party considers justiciable is far too broad. Any practicing lawyer is regularly
confronted by clients who consider as justifiable, claims that the
courts, in their most expansive posture, would not entertain. By
deliberately avoiding a definition of law that hinges upon its
source or one that hinges upon its enforceability, the author introduces a subjective factor that seems to make the content of law
subject to the whims and perceptions of the individual.
Kantorowicz did not wish to qualify the range of consideration
because such a limitation would have introduced into his definition a repository of authority, but the ensuing result runs the considerable danger of having the subjective factor swallow up the
objective ones.
The word "justiciable" was used by the author as a substitute
for "judicial organs," which are defined in terms of impartial parties, following a set of regular procedures in applying the rules,
either consciously or unconsciously, to conflicting parties.
Kantorowicz chose the more general expression because the term
"judicial organs" is so close to courts. He rejected the notion that
the term "law" should be restricted to enforced law, but he did
not reject the line of reasoning that introduced the concept of potential enforceability by an impartial agency following regular
procedures. In this way, unenforced law could still be considered
law as long as it could be considered potentially enforceable. This
solution seems to work, but by positing a scheme of potential exterior enforcement Kantorowicz may not have attained the crosscultural breadth he sought in this definition. Cannot we conceive
of rules that would be viewed as law in their regulation of conduct
without the existence of exterior organs that could potentially en-
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force them? Does exclusive self-enforcement necesarily mean that
custom and not law is being enforced? In feudal Japan a samurai
who had been dishonored resorted to seppuku (suicide). Should
he have not chosen to kill himself, no exterior agency would or
could have meeted out a death sentence. Kantorowicz would
have no difficulty in saying that the rules here are custom and not
law, but can we be sure that such ready categorization is not simply the result of Occidental provincialism?
By using the criterion of justiciability Kantorowicz excluded
much social custom from law. The elders of a tribe may not be
summoned to mind by the phrase "judicial organs," but their decisions are based on rules and a regularized procedure that the
author accommodated within his definition. On the other hand,
despite the fact that a social climber struck from the guest lists of
the local elite for a social faux pas would be effectively sanctioned, it would not be, within the author's definition, for a violation of law. Kantorowicz did recognize, however, that his formulation encompassed a number of "borderline cases."7 Citing lovemaking in medieval times, the chivalrous duel, beer drinking in
German fraternities, and, of most general import, the rules of
sports and games, the author rejected the conclusion that by including such activity within his definition he had confessed his
failure. According to Kantorowicz, unlike the sociological literature that concerns itself with custom, the literature in the areas of
the "borderline cases" is remarkably similar in character to that
of law. To exclude these cases, he maintained, would "deprive the
whole concept of law of its usefulness.""
Although this rationale seems both circular and self-serving,
this reader has some sympathy for it. To encompass the entire
history of law in human society, breadth is essential, and that
what has not been studied in law partakes of many essential characteristics of law should not be surprising. Once the focus has
been shifted away from some connection between formal government and law, there is bound to be considerable difficulty in isolating what is considered as law from other social activity taking
place within a structure of rules. The loose kinship is there and
more is gained philosophically by recognizing it then is by respecting the artificial barriers that so many legal scholars continue to erect and defend. Lawyers have been involved in private
7.
8.

Supra note 2, at 82-89.
Id. at 87.
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rule making for hundreds of years, but the forty years since
Kantorowicz constructed his definition have seen the pace and
extent of such practice accelerating, even to the point where it is
recognized in law school curricula with such titles as School Law
and the Law of Sports. As the legal realists counseled long ago,
look at lawyers and inspect what they are doing to find out what
law is. These more recent developments only further confirm the
usefulness of a definition that seeks to move beyond the cramped
notion of law as governmental edict.
As long as there is value in the jurisprudential quest for a definition of law, Kantorowicz provides a useable model. Avoiding the
verbal magic that distorts the quest, we always must ask for what
purposes the law is defined. To say that we seek not the truth but
usefulness in such a definition is not to degrade the inquiry but
rather to upgrade it to a level where the task has direction and
where a basis of evaluation is presented. Kantorowicz's definition
of law as "a body of social rules prescribing external conduct and
considered justificiable" was intended to provide a framework
upon which a discussion of the history of law in human society
could be built. His lack of complete success leads this reader to
wonder whether a definition can be formulated that would
achieve the author's purpose. Despite the existence of some common characteristics, much of law is as culture bound as are the
scholars who seek to define it.

9. Id. at 79.

